Stephan Blatti
 

in print: books

ESSAYS ON PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

Paul Snowdon (Stephan Blatti, ed.) / Oxford University Press, 2024

A central figure in Anglo-American philosophy for over four decades, Paul Snowdon made seminal contributions to the fields of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and the history of twentieth-century philosophy. Snowdon’s work on perception and perceptual experience—much of which is collected in this volume for the first time—was particularly influential and firmly established ‘disjunctivism’ as a view with which any theorist working in the field must reckon.

In the essays collected in the first part of this volume, Snowdon traces the contours of the concept of perception, refining his formulation of the disjunctivist position, determining the degree of involvement of the concept of causation, and engaging critically with arguments which aim to support sense-data theories. The second part contains critical examinations of the views propounded by several influential philosophers, amounting to a partial sketch of the history of twentieth-century philosophy of perception. Among the figures whose work Snowdon engages are J. L. Austin, A. J. Ayer, Michael Ayers, Michael Hinton, John McDowell, G. E. Moore, H. H. Price, Wilfrid Sellars, P. F. Strawson, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The volume opens with an expansive and intellectually generous introduction in which Snowdon describes the theoretical challenges, approaches, and themes that animate the set of interrelated problems addressed across all sixteen essays. Sprinkled throughout are an array of candid reflections that serve to illuminate both the substantive connections between the essays as well as the historical and circumstantial contexts that occasioned their writing.

 

ANIMALISM

Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon, ed. / Oxford University Press, 2016

What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It has also, amongst philosophers, occasioned strong opposition, even though it might be said to be the view assumed by much of the scientific community. Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, & Identity is the first volume to be devoted to this important topic and promises to set the agenda for the next stage in the debate.

Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who have been instrumental in shaping it. Some of their contributions defend animalism, others criticize it, still others explore its more general implications. The book also contains a substantial introduction by the editors explaining what animalism is, identifying leading issues that merit attention, and highlighting many of the issues that the contributors have raised.

a thoughtful collection of essays that show the healthy state of the current debate about our identity and nature.
— Brian Garrett, Analysis
This volume is the first of its kind: a collection of articles focusing specifically on the Animalist theory of personal identity. ... It is essential reading for anyone working on personal identity, and should be read by anyone interested in the fundamental question as to what kind of thing we human persons are. ... Animalism is a superb collection, packed full of excellent chapters. To anyone interested in Animalism and related topics, this book could not be more highly recommended.
— Alexander P. Moran, Philosophy in Review
This is a well-curated collection that both addresses long-standing issues in the animalist debate and reveals new facets of them. It is clear enough for those who are new to the conversation and deep enough for those who are not.
— Allison Krile Thornton, The Review of Metaphysics
This book will give you a great sense of the ongoing conversation about animalism. This conversation has been around for a while. So the trenches are dug deep; no one is giving a whole lot of ground. Yet it’s still a rich and interesting conversation about a question that concerns us all: What are we?
— Matt Duncan, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
 

ONTOLOGY AFTER CARNAP

Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe, ed. / Oxford University Press, 2016

Analytic philosophy is once again in a methodological frame of mind. Nowhere is this more evident than in metaphysics, whose practitioners and historians are actively reflecting on the nature of ontological questions, the status of their answers, and the relevance of contributions both from other areas within philosophy (e.g., philosophical logic, semantics) and beyond (notably, the natural sciences). Such reflections are hardly new: the debate between Willard van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap about how to understand and resolve ontological questions is widely seen as a turning point in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. And indeed, this volume is occasioned by the fact that the deflationary approach to metaphysics advocated by Carnap in that debate is once again attracting considerable interest and support.

Containing eleven original essays by some of today's leading voices in metametaphysics, Ontology After Carnap aims both to deepen our understanding of Carnap's contributions to metaontology and to explore how this legacy might be mined for insights into the contemporary debate.

This excellent volume is a must-read for those curious about recent work in ontology and metaontology, and the Carnapian turn that it has taken.
— Linda Wetzel (Georgetown University), Australasian Journal of Philosophy
 

THE LIVES OF HUMAN ANIMALS

Stephan Blatti, ed. / Spindel Supplement, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2014

The theme of the 32nd annual Spindel Conference was “The Lives of Human Animals.” Under the direction of Stephan Blatti, the conference focused on the animalist theory of personal identity. On this view, our fundamental nature is given not by our psychological capacities, but by our biological constitution: we are primates (Homo sapiens), and like all organisms, we persist just in case we continue living. This view stands opposed to the standard Lockean account, according to which our fundamental nature is given by our status as self-conscious, rational agents ("persons") and the conditions under which we persist through time and change are to be accounted for in terms of psychological continuity.

The aim of this conference was to encourage a broader engagement with animalism by providing a forum in which metaphysicians and philosophers of mind working on animalism could interact with interested thinkers from outside those areas, including philosophy of biology, ethics, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of religion. Besides animalism in its own right, among the topics explored in these proceedings were the nature of organic life, the metaphysics and ethics of death, issues in animal cognition, animal interests, and the afterlife.

 

in print: articles

we are animals

In Philosophy for Us, ed. Lenny Clapp (Cognella, 2018), 73-82. [pdf]


headhunters

In Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, ed. Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon (Oxford University Press, 2016), 165–87. [pdf]


introduction

(with Sandra Lapointe), in Ontology After Carnap (Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–12. [pdf]


intrODUCTION

(with Paul Snowdon), in Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, (Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–27. [pdf]

 

MORTAL HARM AND THE ANTEMORTEM EXPERIENCE OF DEATH

Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (2014): 640–42. [pdf]

 

INTRODUCTION

Spindel SupplementThe Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2014): 1–5. [pdf]

ANIMALISM

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 edition), ed. Ed Zalta. [link] [pdf]

 

A NEW ARGUMENT FOR ANIMALISM

Analysis 72 (2012): 685–90. [pdf]

 

DEATH'S DISTINCTIVE HARM

American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2012): 317–30. [pdf]

 

MATERIAL CONSTITUTION

In Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Robert Barnard and Neil Manson (Continuum Publishing, 2012), 149–69. [pdf]

 

EDITOR'S NOTE

The Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2010): 1–2. [pdf]

 

BOOK REVIEW

Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy, ed. Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Paulina Remes (Springer, 2007).

Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009): 463–64. [pdf]

BOOK REVIEW

The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity, by Raymond Martin and John Barresi (Columbia University Press, 2006).

Mind 117 (2008): 191–95. [pdf]

 

ANIMALISM, DICEPHALUS, AND BORDERLINE CASES

Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 595–608. [pdf]

 

ANIMALISM AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

In Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships, vol. 2, ed. Marc Bekoff (Greenwood Press, 2007): 430–33. [pdf]

 

NO IMPEDIMENT TO SOLIDITY AS IMPEDIMENT

Metaphysica 7 (2006): 35–41. [pdf]

 

ANIMALISM

In The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, eds. A. C. Grayling, Andrew Pyle, Naomi Goulder (Thoemmes Continuum, 2006), vol. 1: 108–09. [pdf]

DISJUNCTIVISM

In The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, eds. A. C. Grayling, Andrew Pyle, Naomi Goulder (Thoemmes Continuum, 2006), vol. 2: 856–57. [pdf]